A Historical
Discourse of the Philippine Claim over Sabah
By Amando Respicio Boncales, B.A., M.S.Ed., M.A., (PhD).
May 2013
Historiographical Essay
The
Philippine-Malaysian dispute over the State of Sabah remains a contentious
diplomatic issue. There is a very limited amount of literature available that
discusses this complex issue. The works of Teodoro Agoncillo and Renato
Constantino, nationalist historians, discuss the issue. The objective of this
study is to shed light on the historical background of the Philippine claim
over Sabah by examining how various authors in the field presented the issue.
In 1878, the
Sulu sultan entered into a deed of pajak with Austrian Gustavus Baron de
Overbeck and Englishman Alfred Dent, who were representatives of a British
company. The deed was written in Arabic. In 1946, Professor Harold Conklin
translated the term “pajak” as “lease.” The 1878 deed provided for an annual
rental. This treaty constitutes the main basis of the territorial dispute
between the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah. The Philippines claims that
the term “pajak” means “lease,” while Malaysia claims that it means “cession.”[1]
The
Philippine claim to Sabah was formally filed in 1961 at The United Nations during the administration of President
Diosdado Macapagal (1961-1965) based on historical and legal claims. President
Ferdinand Marcos assumed presidency in 1965. His alleged Jabiddah plan, supposedly
proposing the invasion of Sabah, was publicly exposed, bringing the relations
of Malaysia and the Philippines into a state of mistrust.[2]
The first
foreign scholar to have extensively analyzed the Philippine claim to Sabah was
Michael Leifer, author of the monograph The
Philippine Claim to Sabah. It was a major departure from the documents
published by the Philippines government because it was the first to put the
Sabah issue in its proper historical contest. The paper provides a good
background of the Philippine claim to Sabah, although it relies heavily on a
two-volume set of documents published by the Philippine government. Leifer also
utilizes newspaper articles and books to place the Sabah issue in the context
of Macapagal’s presidency.
The author
asserts Macapagal envisioned this as a diplomatic gain rather than a political
gain. Macapagal pictured Mania as the
center of Southeast Asia, a Mecca where the other Asian countries to flock to
on pilgrimage. He saw this new role as a
means to become accepted by the mainstream Asian countries by its stand with
Indonesia against United Kingdom backed Malaysia. He hoped to gain a new respect for the voice
of the Philippines, who up until this time had been mostly overlooked, shunned
even because of its support of American positions. They saw their position as both the
protagonist and mediator. Indonesia was
perfectly willing to let Philippines take that role.[3]
Leifer maintains that the
Macapagal approach to the issue more was unbalanced.[4]
Macapagal’s plan to use the Philippines to block Malaysia and establish respect
among Southeast Asia was flawed. The
flaw was in his inability to see the contradictions of his policy. Maphilindo, was meant as an alternative to
Malaysia and should have been an alliance among the states, bonded over their
fear of the Chinese and their desire to expand.
For
Malaysia, however, the Chinese community is not an insignificant numerical
minority without domestic political import. Thus, to accept the implications of
Maphilindo was to invite alienation on the part of the Malaysian Chinese.[5]
In 1969, the
year after Leifer’s book was published, under the auspices of the National
Historical Commission, the Philippines organized a conference on Sabah. The
proceedings were published in a book titled Symposium
on Sabah. One of the important chapters within the book is that of Prof.
Rolando N. Quintos, who suggests alternatives for the solution of the Sabah
dispute in his chapter, “The Sabah Question: Prospects and Alternatives."
Quintos offers some provocative ideas and argues that the issue of Sabah should
be seen in its two aspects: First, the legal issue in regard to the proprietary
rights of the heirs of the Sultanate; and second, the question of political
jurisdiction over Sabah. Quintos proposed a compromise deal, arguing further
that "the Philippines [shall] accept the justice of the Malaysian appeal
to self-determination and accept as final the conclusion of the U.N. Secretary
General the United Nation of September 1963, provided that the Malaysians are
willing to submit the issue to the World Court or to a mutually acceptable
mediating body.”[6]
The work of a Malaysian, Mohammed bin
Dato Othman Ariff, The Philippine Claim
to Sabah: Its Historical, Legal and Political Implications, extensively
discusses the legal issues surrounding the claim. The main thesis of this book
is to discredit the legal basis of the Philippine claim to Sabah. The author
emphasizes the legal foundation of the United Kingdom’s claim to Sabah based on
possession and consolidation through peaceful and continuous display of State
activities.
Furthermore, Ariff illuminates the basis
for the integration of Sabah to Malaysia through the principle of
self-determination.[7] On September 16, 1963 after
a four-month referendum on Sabah and Sarawak, the Cobbold Commision report was
presented to the British government joining Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak
and Sabah (North Borneo) to form Malaysia; this after just a month of Sabah’s
gaining it’s independence.[8] United Borneo Front chairman
Jeffrey Kitingan disputes the referendum in which Prime Minister Najib Tun
Razak and other’s claim that Sabahans’
desire to be part of Malaysia. “There has never been a referendum on Sabah
as stated by some academics. In fact,
the so-called referendum in 1962-63 was actually only a sampling survey of less
than four percent of the Sabah population,” he said.[9]
Finally,
Ariff argues that the peaceful settlement of the dispute would require the
Philippines to drop the claim and concentrate all of its efforts in working
closely and cooperating with Malaysia in the context of Association of
Southeast Asian Nation ASEAN.[10] For the heirs of the Sultan
of Sulu, given their established proprietary rights in 1931 through the North
Borneo Court, this kind of suggestion is unacceptable.
Another non-Filipino scholar, S.
Jayakumar, who is from the University of Singapore, also argues that the
Philippine case is weak. Like Ariff, Jayakumar invokes the idea of effective
occupation on the part of the United Kingdom in Sabah since 1878, which granted
the British North Borneo Company a charter of corporate character. The author
contends that the Philippine claim is abstract and vague, based only on
historically derived rights of the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu. Jayakumar
further argues that neither the Philippines nor the heirs of the Sultan have
exercised sovereignty or been in effective occupation of Sabah since 1878. Also
like Ariff, the author emphasizes the effective occupation of Sabah by the
United Kingdom. Therefore, Malaysia, as the successor state, is now the
legitimate sovereign of Sabah. Like Ariff, Jayakumar emphasizes the principle
of self-determination.
In Sulu and Sabah: A study of British policy
toward the Philippines and North Borneo (1978), Nicholas Tarling, an 18th century historian postulates British
policy going back as far as the 18th century and continuing until 1903 was the
context for Sulu and Sabah. In direct
opposition to Tregonning’s assertion, Tarling claims the 13 Protocol of 1885
did not necessarily inherit the Sulu Sultanate’s sovereignty over Sabah. He
acknowledges the 1878 agreement between the Sultan of Sulu and Baron Van
Oberbeck was a lease rather than a cession. He does however agree with Quintos
that a continuation of the lease in perpetuity could very well be the solution
to the ongoing dispute.[11]
Under the
agreement known as “The Madrid Protocol of 1885” Spain is limited in its
influence in the region including relinquishing all rights to Borneo. This
agreement between Spain, Germany and Great Britain requires Spain to renounce
all claims of sovereignty over the territories of Borneo that had belonged to
the Sultan of Sulu. It also renounced
sovereignty that were made of up of the islands of Balambangan, Banguey, and
Malawali along with everything within three maritime leagues from the coast and
the territories that formed the “British North Borneo Company.”[12]
One of the
scholars in political science who has done considerable work on the Sabah issue was
Lela Garner Noble, author of the book Philippine
Policy Towards Sabah: Claim to Independence. The author argues that the Philippine foreign policy on the Sabah issue during the time period from
Macapagal through Marcos was evidence of Philippine’s desire to be seen as
independent from outside forces, most specifically the United States. They wanted to improve what many Filipinos
felt was an embarrassing image as a puppet of the United States. The claim to Sabah demonstrates an
independent policy because the policy was “non-American in conception or
direction.”[13]
Like most
scholars who examined the Sabah issue, Noble, Sussman, and Leifer view the
issue as a political question, and none of them consider the issue in a
historical way. Although Leifer did provide considerable background material
about the Sabah issue in his research, he still saw it as largely a
contemporary political angle. The authors mentioned above do not discuss the
historical background and instead concentrate on contemporary political issue
only.
As one may recall, both Ariff and
Jayakumar disagree with the Philippine case. Regarding the transfer of
sovereignty from the British North Borneo Company to the British Crown of Sabah
in the 1878 Deed of Lease, the Philippine government takes the position that it
was illegal and "an act of naked political aggrandizement." Hence,
the transfer of sovereignty from the British Crown to the Federation of
Malaysia of Sabah was unwarranted.
Paridah Abd.
Samad and Darussalam Abu Bakar in "Malaysia-Philippine Relations: The
Issue of Sabah,” published in 1992, emphasized the bilateral relations between
the two countries. The paper presented sub-themes such as (a) the political and
security repercussions of the Sabah dispute with regard to the Moro
secessionism in the south, (b) the overlapping of territorial boundaries, (c)
Malaysian incursion into Philippine waters, and (d) the issue of Filipino
refugees and illegal immigrants in Sabah from the Macapagal to the Aquino
administrations.[14]
The
Philippines has nothing to lose by preserving the status quo in Sabah. Their inactivity comes at a price of missed
opportunities. However, Malaysia stands
to benefit from the treasures of Sabah and its waters. Though the price of the status quo is negligible,
this non-resolution of a claim by the Philippines would be a stumbling block to
the intra-ASEAN cooperation.
Malaysia is
fully supported by Great Britain and the Commonwealth of Nations in rejecting
the claim, while the Philippines has literally no international support. Even
the United States, Philippine’s biggest ally had assumed a neutral position.
Though the other ASEAN countries appeared to distance themselves from the issue
so as not to take sides between two of their members, privately acknowledged
Malaysia’s rights to the territory.[15]
Malaysia
asserts that it has honored its financial obligations and is prepared to
negotiate directly with the Sulu heirs without Philippine intrusion. They
assert this matter is between them and the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu. In fact
the descendants of the Sultan receives M$5,000 ($2,008 US) every year as part
of the cession of the area leased to the British Company in the 19th century.[16]
Arnold M. Azurin’s Beyond the Cult of Dissidence in Southern Philippines and Wartorn Zones
in the Global Village (1996) devoted Part Two to the Sabah issue. Azurin argues in favor of dropping the Philippine claim, except the proprietary rights of the heirs. The various treaties signed by
the Sulu Sultan since the 18th century followed a historical pattern
of ceding and leasing certain portions of the sultanate’s dominion to outside
powers, depending on the rise and ebb of its own fortunes and powers relative
to that of the contracting parties. “Unfortunately, those contending parties
had in mind to transform the 'franchise' into a lasting colonial dominion.”[17] Malacanang should have
thought in the 1960s that to claim ownership of a piece of land through Torrens
Title is one thing, while claiming dominion or sovereignty over a vast
territory is another.[18]
Another work
that has a fresh interpretation of the issue is Asiri Abubukar’s “Bangsa Sug,
Sabah and Sulus' quest for Peace and Autonomy in Southern Philippines” (2000).
The author asserts that there exists a continuing sense of identification and
affiliation among the Sulu people with Sabah. Because of the strong sense of
connection and affiliation to Sabah among the people in Sulu, Abubakar argues
that settling the Sabah issue is vital to peace process in the southern
Philippines, particularly in the quest for autonomy by the Sulu people. The
identification, connection, and affiliation of the Sulu people with Sabah is
through the defunct Sulu Sultanate; the influx of Filipino immigrants to Sabah
further reinforces the connection.[19]
Another
factor that Abubakar pointed out is that the strategic location for trade of
the Sulu-Sabah area since the height of the Sulu Sultanate will continue to be significant
as part of the Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines-East Asian Growth Area
(BIMP-EAGA). The author believes the Sabah issue is intertwined with the Moro
problem in Mindanao.[20] He postulates that
resolving the Sabah issue would indeed move Southern Philippines closer to a
lasting peace.
For the most
part of the Sabah issue, it is the 1878 deed that causes the most contention
among various academics. Tarling maintains that the “territory was held by the
Company under a lease agreement, and this the British Government should admit.”[21] However, he believes that
the Philippine government cannot “inherit the sultanate’s sovereignty over
North Borneo” under the protocol of 1885. His recommendation is the
continuation of the lease in perpetuity.[22]
A History of modern Sabah:
1881-1963 (1960),
written by historian K. G. Tregonning, analyzes the Sabah issue that the
agreement in 1878 between the Sulu Sultans and Baron Van Overbeck was one of a
cession not a lease; furthermore, several treaties and international
conventions have excluded North Borneo from the territory of the Philippines.[23]
Arrif’s The Philippine Claim to Sabah: Its
Historical, Legal and Political Implications has a strong pro-Malaysian
sentiments and maintains that the agreement of 1878 was a “Deed of Cession.”[24] Instead, he recommends that
given the close historical ties between the peoples of the Philippines and
North Borneo, both Malaysia and the Philippines should maintain and promote
healthy relations to ensure the security of the region. The adaption of this
“formula” would require the Philippines to drop its claim and concentrate all
of its efforts on working closely with Malaysia.[25]
Leifer’s The Philippine Claim to Sabah clarifies
that the focus of his study is the political and non-legal aspect of the
presentation of the Philippine claim. However, he recognizes that the
predecessors of the British North Borneo Company (BNBC) were private lessees of
the Sultan of Sulu, and in effect cannot acquired dominion over a territory
through a contract, also known as Pajak of 1878. The BNBC was barred from
acquiring sovereignty by its private status and by the terms of its charter.[26]
International
law provides for the lease of a territory in which a state grants another state
the right to control at least part of the lessor’s territory. Once the territory is leased the sovereignty
remains with the lessor and not under its jurisdiction which is granted to the
lessee. The lease of the territory is
usually given in exchange of an annual fee.[27]
After examining
the existing literature regarding the Philippine claim, I believe that the
Philippine claim to Sabah is valid, with strong historical roots. It is my
opinion, like those of Tarling and Tregonning, that the Deed of 1878 is not a
transfer of sovereignty, but a lease granted by the Sultan of Sulu to British
subjects; a private venture. In this historiographical essay, I observe that
the Sabah issue is a post-colonial symptom that needs to be treated to achieve
lasting peace in this part of Southeast Asia, an opinion shared with Azurin’s Beyond the Cult of Dissidence in Southern
Philippines and Wartorn Zones in the Global Village.
Historical Foundation
The rise of
Islam in Southeast Asia revolutionized specific social institutions in the
region. Islam as a politico-religious institution had triggered the
modification and introduction of social institutions that shaped present day
Southeast Asia. Among the most important developments was the introduction of
the sultanate (a developed political and at the same time religion institution)
to the region. For the purpose of this research, my study will focused on the
development of the Sulu sultanate as part of the greater Malayan world and the
eventual claim of the Philippines to Sabah (as the political successor at
sovereignty of the Sulu Sultanate).
The
objective of this study is to trace the historical and legal basis of the
Philippine claim over the State of Sabah. The methodology of the study will be
thematical not chronological. Instead of being conscious of the timeline, the
study will concentrate on the major themes that shaped the sultanate’s Sabah
dominion, lease and agreements with western world and the present claim of the
Philippines to the Sabah State. The words “North Borneo,” “British Borneo” or “Sabah”
are used interchangeably in the study. These words are used to that portion of
the North Borneo Island to which the sultan of Sulu once ruled.
Available
historical records seem to indicate that the dispute territory was a possession
of the Sultan of Sulu which evidently was leased to the founders of a British
chartered company. With protection of the crown guaranteed over the lease
territory, later became the foundation British annexation and colonization.
Eventually, Sabah was included in the federation of Malaysia.
The foundation of the Sultanate of Brunei and Sulu
The sultanates of Sulu and Borneo
were well established political entity in the Malay world during the late 15th
and 16th century. The Arabs, who had settled in Malacca in 1400, did
not extended political control over the two sultanates other than spreading the
teaching of Islam. The Chinese did the same who frequented the areas held by the
two sultanates to trade with the natives.
The
sultanate of Sulu was founded in 1380, nearly one and a half century before the
arrival of the Spaniards in the Philippines. The sultanate possessed an
efficient political organization, extending its influence in Zamboanga,
Basilan, Palawan, aside from the Sulu archipelago.[28]
During its supremacy, the sultanate extended its control as far as the Visayas
and Luzon until controlled by the Spanish conquistadores in the Philippines.
For many years to come, as the colonial government consolidated it territory,
the sultanate was to remain a problem by the Spanish and American colonial
government (viewed as pirates and buccaneers).[29]
The
Sultanate of Brunei, on the other hand, was founded in the 15th
century. For a brief period, it became a tributary of the Majapahit Empire.[30] Before the British entry in
to the region, the sultanate exercise nominal control over the whole
northwestern and eastern coast of the island.
Related by
its common Malay origin, the two sultanates were bounded together by religious
ties with the spread of Islam in the Malay world. Trade between their
respective subjects served to reinforce this relationship even more.
Borneo and the Western World
The Portuguese and the Spaniards,
in search of spice, were the earliest among the westerners to arrive in the
East Indies and establish themselves in Malacca early in the 16th
century. British interest in the Sulu-Borneo area stemmed primarily from the
East Indian Company’s desire to establish a factory.[31]
The head of this particular project was Alexander Dalrymple, who, in January
1761, negotiated a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with the Sultan of Sulu.
The agreement was confirmed by another treaty in February 1763 reiterating the
major provision, emphasizing defense alliance.
But the company appeared unable to
take advantage of this concession. When it finally decided, in 1769, to occupy
Balambangan and made use of the ceded territory, disease and strained relations
with the Sultan of Sulu erupted that led to open war, hence preventing the
development of the enterprise. The Balambanagn settlement was abandoned in 1775
until a second attempt was made in 1803, which again was abandoned in 1805.
Under
the Act of 1858, the East Indian Company was dissolved and its interests were
transferred to the crown. However, evidence seems to suggest that the
territories ceded by the Sulu failed to interest the British government
further. Lord Canning, as the first viceroy to British India, repudiated the
“doctrine of lapse” and was further enunciated by his predecessor (the Earl of
Derby). The Earl of Derby, in explaining
to the British Ambassador in Germany the nature of Spanish claim to North
Borneo:
It should be mentioned that
previously to 1836 Spain claimed the island on the ground of first discovery,
ancient treaties, and alleged occupations; but those claims were never admitted
by Great Britain. . . . Great Britain also had rights under Treaties with Sulu,
dated 1761, 1764, and 1769, BUT those treaties must be considered as having
lapsed.[32](Emphasis
added)
Almost two decade before the
dissolution of the East Indian Company, an Englishman named James Brooke[33] visited Sarawak, and
shortly after was offered by the Sultan of Brunei the governorship of Sarawak
in exchange for aid in the face of continuing rebellion. Later in 1841, Brooke
was proclaimed Rajah and in subsequent years, he succeeded in minimizing piracy
in Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo with the cooperation of the British Navy.
The involvement of Brooke made him “the supreme ruler of Sarawak or the White
Rajah.”[34]
In 1846, the British flag was
raised on Labuan Island off the cost the east coast of Sabah. And in the following year, Great Britain and
Brunei the concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, at the same time that
Labuan was ceded in perpetuity to the crown.
The United States became similarly
attracted to Borneo, eager of obtaining the favors that had been secured by
other western powers. In 1850, a treaty was signed for the United States
advantages for the most favored nation, and later an American consul was
appointed to Brunei. Borneo-Sulu area became increasing attractive in terms of
commerce for its strategic location in the region, especially maritime traffic.
Brunei’s Cession of Sabah to Sulu.
Although wealthy, the Sultan of
Brunei had a court that was corrupt and ridden with intrigues. Consequently,
the sultan found difficulty in extending control to many of his datus
throughout the domain, rebellion and strife was frequent in the sultanate. It
was under this circumstances that the territory, comprising most of what is now
Sabah State, was ceded to the neighboring sultanate as the prize for military
assistance.
The murder of the 12th
Sultan of Brunei, Muhammad Ali, by Bendehara Abdul Mubin resulted to civil war.
The perpetrator claimed the throne but was contested by Pengeran Bongso, a
nephew and son-in-law of the deceased sultan. Both contestants to the throne
asked the support of Badarud-din, a relative of both and the reigning Sultan of
Sulu. Badarud-din was unable to solve the crisis, but supported Pengeran Bongso
(who took the name Sultan Muaddin).
Sultan Muaddin emerged victorious and the large territorial land known
today as “the State of Sabah” was ceded to the Sultanate of Sulu in exchange of
the military help and support.
The observation of the
contemporary British officer will give us more insight of the territory ceded:
The first material alteration in
the sovereignty of the territorial possession took place in the kingdom of
Borneo Proper, when his Raja was obliged to call in the aid of the Solos to
defend him against an insurrection of the Maruts and Chinese. In consideration
of this important aid, the Raja of Borneo Proper ceded to the Sultan of Solo
all that portion of Borneo then belonging to him, from Kimanis in latitude 5°
30’ north to Tapean-durian, in the straits of Macassar, which include the whole
north of Borneo.[35]
The
sultanate’s connection with Northern Borneo goes back as early as 1521, as far
as the written record is concerned, when a Brunei Sultan was married to a Sulu
princess. This early connection between the two sultanates cemented the
familial relationship. This political marriage developed into a
politico-military allegiance.
Meanwhile, as trade flourished in
the region, the mercantilist policies adapted by the colonial powers deprived
the Sultanate of Brunei and Sulu of their own profitable commercial activity.
Thus driven into piracy and smuggling, the Sulus and the Bruneis continually
menaced western trade, presenting a problem that was to persist for many years.
Territorial Grant from Brunei
Baron von Overbeck, Austrian
Consul-General at Hongkong at that time, convinced Dent in supporting a venture
in Sabah and together they planned to sell their rights to any interested
government.[36] With the money he received
from Dent to conduct negotiations, the baron sailed to Brunei. He succeeded in
persuading the Sultan, who presumably could not resist the tempting
compensation offered. On December 29, 1877, the sultan entered into agreement
with von Overbeck, in which the latter gained three territorial “grant” and for
which the sultan received a total annual payment of 12, 000 Malayan
Dollars. In addition the sultan
appointed von Overbeck “supreme ruler” with the title of “Maharajah of Sabah
and Rajah of Gaya and Sandakan,” with delegated powers to govern the territory.
[37]
The Baron,
however, evidently realized that several factors tended to depreciate the value
of the grants he had obtained. This is because more than a century and a half
earlier the territory had already been ceded to the Sultan of Sulu who was in
actual possession. Moreover, Brunei chiefs refused to recognize the Sultan of
Brunei’s rights to cede the territory.[38]
Von Overbeck, aware of the Sultan
of Sulu’s dominion in North Borneo, found it necessary to entered into
negotiation with the sultan for the lease of the territory. Overbeck and
William W. Treacher, the Acting British Consul-General at Labuan Island in
Borneo, went to Sulu in January 1878. The contract dated January 22, 1878, was
drafted by Overbeck himself and was written in Malayan language with Arabic
character.
Territorial Lease from Sulu.
From Labuan, Baron von Overbeck,
Joseph W. Torrey, and William Clark Cowie sailed to Jolo on board the steamer, America, arriving at their destination
on January 16. Consul Treacher also reached Jolo on the same day, having sailed
separately on the British Warship, Fly.
Von Overbeck and his companion
were shrewd negotiators and their combined effort brought to bear on the
sultan, already hard-press by an ongoing campaign in Sulu, was hardly in a
position to refuse. During the bargaining, Cowie, whom the sultan had great
confidence as a gun-smuggling partner, contributed his own persuasive influence
after having been led to believed that von Overbeck would reward him.[39]
Treacher, whom the sultan
consulted, said that Overbeck represented “a bona fide British company,” and
intimated to the Sultan that the Spanish Captain-General himself was at the
head of the expedition already in Zamboanga poised and ready to destroy Jolo;
and that the Sultan of Brunei had recently ceded to them the territory and was
already to take possession of it anyway. [40]
Evidently a lease of the sultan’s possession in Sabah, its pertinent provisions
read thus:
We Sri Paduka Maulana Al Sultan
Mohammad Jamalul A’lam, son of Sari Paduka Marhum Al Sultan Mohammad Pulalum,
Sultan of Sulu and of all dependencies thereof, on behalf of ourselves
and for our heirs and successors, and with the expressed desire of all Datus in
common agreement, do hereby desire to lease of our own free will and
satisfaction, to Gustavus Baron de Overbeck of Hong Kong, and to Alfred Dent,
Esquire, of London, who act as representatives of a British company, together
with their heirs, associate, successors, and assigns forever and until the end
of time, all rights and powers which we possess over all the territories and
lands tributary from the Pandasan River on the east, and thence along the whole
east coast as far as Sibuku on the South, and including all territories,
on the Pandasan River and in the coastal area, known as Paitan, Sugut, Banggai,
Labuk, Sandakan, China-Batangan, Murniang and all other territories and coastal
lands to the south, bordering on Darvel Bay and as far as the Sibuku River,
together with all the lands which lie within nine miles from the coast.
The cession (as the Malaysian
prefer to interpret it) or lease (as the Sulu Sultanate maintain) of Sabah to
the British began in the Treaty of 1878 between Baron de Overbeck and His
Highness the Sultan Jamal Al-Alam was signed for an annual payment of 5,000
Malayan dollars.
It should be
noted that Consul Treacher succeeded in formalizing the participation of his
government in the agreement, by affixing the participation of his government in
the agreement, by affixing his signature as a sole witness to the transaction.
Unlike in the Brunei grants of the previous year, Treacher’s recommendation
were accepted by the Sulu Sultan, namely, that the “consent” of the British
government would first be obtained before any transfer of territory and that
its “consideration and judgment” shall be sought in event of any dispute.
Together
with the Territorial Agreement, the sultan also appointed von Overbeck as
“supreme and independent ruler” with the title of “Datu Bandahara and Rajah of
Sandakan,” delegating him as a vassal power with which to administer the
territory. However, the sultan made it clear that Oberbeck made the title not
him.[41]
The Philippines Claim over Sabah and its Arguments.
It is the
thesis of the Philippine government that the contract of 1878 was a lease, and
not a transfer of ownership or sovereignty. Treacher, who was present at the
signing of the contract and as witness, characterized the contract as a lease
and referred to the money payment as annual rentals.
Diosdado
Macapagal, who served in the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1946 and later
became President of the Philippines, advocated filing a claim at the United
Nations. The filing took place on June
22, 1962. They claim sovereignty, jurisdiction
and proprietary ownership of North Borneo.
The Philippines claim they have the legal and historical rights to North
Borneo as the successor-in-interest of the Sultan of Sulu.
In the early
part of the 1960s it became an imperative for the Philippines, aside from the
strong historical and legal rights that North Borneo is important to Philippine
territory and vital to its security. At this time (1960’s), communism in the
region was in its height and Philippines were anxious that Malaya would succumb
to the potent communist threat from mainland Southeast Asia, creating a scenario
in which a communist territory would be immediately at the southern frontier of
the Philippines.[42]
Philippine
anxiety on the communist threat has subsided, but another form of menace
developed. From the dynamics of the Muslim separatist movement in the south,
there evolved a more terrifying threat. The Sabah state of present Malaysia
harbored some of the kidnappers, Abu Sayyaf and Al-Quedah, provoking
international concern through widespread violence, state wide terror and their
vision of establishing independent states.
The British
North Borneo Company based its rights from the grant signed in January, 1878.
In it, the sultan of Sulu granted certain concessions and privileges to Baron
de Overbeck, an Austrian national who was at the time the Austrian Consul-General
at Hongkong, and Alfred Dent, a British national, in consideration of an annual
rent or tribute of 5,000 Malayan dollars. Dent later bought out Overbeck, and
transferred his rights to the British North Borneo Company. The Company was
granted a Royal Charter on November 1, 1881.
The
Philippine government argues that Overdeck and Dent (the leasors) did not
acquire sovereignty or dominion over North Borneo. This is because, according
to international law, sovereignty can be ceded only to sovereign entities (e.g.
government to government agreement) or to individuals acting for sovereign
entities (agreement between leaders of nations). Obviously, Overbeck and Dent
were private citizens of their respective countries who did not represent any
sovereign entities, but instead acted as mere businessmen who only acquired
grant of lease from the Sultan of Sulu. Hence, neither of them did not, and
could not, acquire sovereignty or dominion.[43]
The above
letter was written by the British Foreign Minister to explain and respond to
the Spanish protest regarding the grant of Royal Charter to the British North
Borneo Company. It was not the Spanish crown which made the protest alone; the
Dutch government also protested in the same way. Again, Lord Granville maintained
in his letter to the Dutch that the British North Borneo Company was a mere
administrator, and that the “British Government assumed no sovereign rights
whatever in Borneo.”[44]
The Philippine government, therefore, strongly argues that the transfer of rights, powers and interest by the British North Borneo Company to the British Crown was not possible. North Borneo Cession Order of 1946 took place just six days immediately after the Philippines was declared independent by the United States. In the International Law, a transferee (British Crown) cannot acquire more rights than the transferor (British North Borneo Company). In other words, how can the British Crown exercise sovereign rights in the form of protectorate in 1946, when the British North Borneo Company did not exercise nor assume sovereignty over North Borneo? In other words, how can the British North Borneo Company transfer sovereignty to the British Crown, which the company did not have in the first place?
The Philippine government, therefore, strongly argues that the transfer of rights, powers and interest by the British North Borneo Company to the British Crown was not possible. North Borneo Cession Order of 1946 took place just six days immediately after the Philippines was declared independent by the United States. In the International Law, a transferee (British Crown) cannot acquire more rights than the transferor (British North Borneo Company). In other words, how can the British Crown exercise sovereign rights in the form of protectorate in 1946, when the British North Borneo Company did not exercise nor assume sovereignty over North Borneo? In other words, how can the British North Borneo Company transfer sovereignty to the British Crown, which the company did not have in the first place?
It has been said that President
Manuel L. Quezon of the Commonwealth of the Philippines (the transitional,
semi-autonomous government of the Philippines under American sovereignty which
preceded the independent republic) “had decided not to recognize the continued
existence of the Sultanate of Sulu, particularly in reference to North Borneo.”
The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs was not able to find a written
record of this statement. This pronouncement was against the Organic Law of the
Philippine Commonwealth, since the power to give and terminate recognition
during the Commonwealth Philippines was vested only in the Congress of the
United States of America (being the colonial power). Aside from the political
technicality, International Law dictates that any withdrawal or termination of
recognition does not imply the dissolution of the entity affected by the
withdrawal.[45]
The
Philippine government believes that Dent, who was granted a Royal Charter in
the form of British North Borneo Company by the British government, to which
the British Crown derived its claim of sovereignty, was not authorized to
acquire sovereignty or dominion. Evidence to this was the official
correspondence of Lord Earl Granville, British Foreign Minister at the time, in
his letter to the British Minister in Madrid dated January 7, 1882, explaining
the character of the Charter Grant of the British North Borneo Company, as
follows:
The British Charter therefore
differs essentially from the previous Charters granted by the Crown to the East
India company, the Hudson’s Bay Company, the New Zealand Company, and other
Associations of that character, in the fact that
the Crown in the present case assumes no dominion or sovereignty over the
territories occupied by the company, nor does it purport to grant to the
Company any powers of government thereover; it merely confer upon the
persons associated the status and incidents of a body corporate, and recognizes the grants of territory and the
powers of government made and delegated by the sultan in whom the sovereignty
remains vested…As regards the general feature of the undertaking, it is to be observed that the territories
granted to the Company have been for generations under the government of the
Sultan of Sulu and Brunei, with whom Great Britain has had Treaties of Peace
and Commerce.[46] [Emphasis Added]
The British
Foreign Minister writes this letter to explain and respond to the Spanish protest
regarding the grant of Royal Charter to the British North Borneo Company. It
was not the Spanish crown who made the protest alone; also the Dutch government
protested. Again Lord Granville maintains, in his letter to the Dutch, that the
British North Borneo Company was a mere administrator, and that “British
Government assumed no sovereign rights whatever in Borneo.”[47]
The
Philippine government, therefore, strongly argues that the transfer of rights,
powers, and interest by the British North Borneo Company to the British Crown,
known as North Borneo Cession Order of 1946 (that took place six days
immediately after the Philippines was declared independent by the United
States), was not possible. In the International Law, a transferee (British
Crown) cannot acquire more rights than the transferor (British North Borneo
Company). In other words, how can the British Crown acquire sovereign rights
(in the form of protectorate in 1946), when the British North Borneo Company
did not exercise nor assume sovereignty over North Borneo? Again, since
Overbeck and Dent did not acquire rights of sovereignty or dominion over North
Borneo their transferee (British North Borneo Company), also, did not acquire
rights of sovereignty or dominion.
The 1930 Convention between the United States and
Great Britain and its implication to the Philippine Sabah Claim
Under the
Carpenter Agreement of 1915, the Sultan of Sulu agreed to relinquish its
temporal power over Sulu but retained his sovereignty over North Borneo. As
Governor Carpenter clarified in this communication to the director of the
Non-Christian tribe on May 4, 1920, as follows:
It is necessary however that
there be clearly (sic) of official record the fact that the termination of the
temporal sovereignty of the Sultanate of Sulu within American territory is
understood to be wholly without prejudice or effect as to the temporal
sovereignty and ecclesiastical authority of the sultanate beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States Government especially with reference
to that portion of the Island of Borneo which as a dependency of the Sultanate
of Sulu is understood to be held under lease by the chartered company which is
known as the British North Borneo Company. ”
The American Governor General of
the Philippine Island Francis B. Harrison made it more clear that: “It is true Governor Carpenter’s contract or
treaty with the Sultan of Sulu of 1915 deprived the Sultan of his temporal
sovereignty in the Philippine archipelago but did not interfere with the
Sultan’s status of sovereignty over British North Borneo lands.”[48]
It is in the context of this
statement that the 1930 Convention between the United States and Great Britain
defined their respective boundaries. The United States did not intend to claim
North Borneo. By this act of defining
the respective boundaries, the United States did not cede or waive anything to
the British Crown.
Submission of the Sultan of Sulu
of the Sovereignty of Spain 1851 and Protocol of 1885
Spain’s claim to North Borneo is
based on the fact the sultanate “admitted herself a vassal of Spain on the
basis of this treaty Spain was claiming all the possessions of Sulu and North
Borneo.” However, this is not
necessarily as it seems. The fact is
North Borneo was not included in the former treaty. The British government did not recognize the
Spanish claim. In a Protocol of Peace
between Spain, Germany and Great Britain signed March 7, 1885 Spain gave up its
claims of sovereignty over North Borneo to Great Britain leading to British
claim of sovereignty since then.[49]
The document signed by the sultan
in 1878, recognizing Spanish sovereignty over “Jolo and its dependencies,” had
no mention on the inclusion of the sultan’s territory in North Borneo. It is
important to first clarify that Spain never acquired sovereignty over North
Borneo. In the protocol signed, the term
“pretension” to sovereignty over North Borneo was used; hence Spain did not
transfer sovereignty to Great Britain (a sovereignty Spain never had; it was
merely a pretension). Second, “Jolo and its dependencies” was a geo-political
unit different and distinct from the North Borneo possession. To give a more
vivid example for this argument, let us try to examine Spanish geo-political
units in its Asian positions, known as “Espana Oceanica:”[50]
1.
The
Philippine Archipelago proper;
2.
The Island
and archipelago of Jolo, conformably with existing treaties with the Sultan of
Sulu;
3.
The portion
of Northeast cost of Borneo that forms part of the dominion of the Sultan;
4.
The Marianas
Islands; and
5.
Other
territories which now belong or which may belong in the future to Spain.
North Borneo
was not considered a dependency of Jolo. As shown in the list of “Espana
Oceanica,” North Borneo was a geo-political unit different and distinct from
the Archipelago of Jolo. It is clear that the sultan did not include his
territory and dominion in North Borneo in signing the treaty recognizing the
Spanish sovereignty. Another thing to consider was the Spanish Geo-political
division in “Espana Oceanica.” In the Spanish geo-political law, the
regulations were clear about that.[51]
The signing
of the sultan in 1885 recognizing Spanish sovereignty over “Jolo and its
dependencies” did not transfer sovereignty to Great Britain. In the protocol of peace between Germany,
Great Britain, and Spain, it was clearly stated that the Spanish claim of
sovereignty was worded in the text as “pretension.” By this, it did not result in transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to Great Britain.
Therefore, the contention that Spain’s renunciation of sovereignty over
its North Borneo territory in favor of Great Britain that resulted in transfer
of sovereignty from the Sulu Sultanate to Great Britain is incorrect.
Macaskie Dictum of 1939
In a 1939
case the heirs of Sultan Jamalul Kiram claimed money was owed to them under the
1878 grant. They were awarded a “cession
of right” by the High Court of North Borneo.
Nine heirs of the Sultan of Sulu won the award in the Macaskie
Judgment. Charles Frederick Cunningham
Macaskie was the presiding chief justice[52]
The ruling was made on the shares entitled by each claimant. [53]
The issue
before the court was the identity of the heirs of the sultan who were entitled
to receive payments after his death.
Through their attorney, they had the only an English translation by
Maxwell and Gibson, a translation of the Grant of 1878 that incorrectly
characterized this as a cession instead of a lease. A later translation made it clear that this
was an incorrect translation.
It should be
recalled, that the Grant in 1878 is in Arabic script and is worded in the
Malayan language. When the lawyer of the
heirs filed the case, he had no original copy of the Grant. The erroneous
Maxwell-Gibson translation was the one used, quoted, and paraphrased in the
complaint filed by the attorney for the heirs of the Sultan. Years after the Macaskie dictum was made
(which translated the Grant as cession instead of lease), the Philippine
government had the copy translated into English. According to the result of the
translation, the Grant of 1878 was a Lease Agreement. Under this circumstance,
the Philippine Government could not accept the dictum of Judge Macaskie. In the judgment, the Grant of 1878 was viewed
as a permanent cession or sale, and that the money that was to be paid to the
heirs is “cession money.”[54]
The former
United States Governor General of the Philippine Islands, Francis Harrison
repudiated the Macaskie judgment stating, “Upon examination of our own
translation of the original document (in photostat) it will be seen that
Maxwell and Gibson, the English authors on whose text the decision of Mr.
Justice Mackaskie was based, have changed the language so as to make the
document a grant cession instead of lease, as it really was, and as the word
“padjak” in the original really means. In view of this vital divergence from
the original text, I do not find myself able to give full faith and credit to
the opinion of Mr. Justice Mackaskie in the famous case in 1939 in Sandakan.”[55]
In a letter addressed to Vice
President and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Elpidio Quirino, dated February 27,
1947, Harrison explained that:
In reviewing the subject of the
claims of the Sultanate of Sulu to their ancient patrimony in North Borneo, one
must come to the conclusion that the action of the British Government in
announcing on the sixteenth of July [the annexation of North Borneo to the
British Crown], just twelve days after the inauguration of the Republic of the
Philippines, a step taken by the British Government unilaterally, and without
any special notice to the Sultanate of Sulu, nor consideration of their legal
rights, was an act of political aggression which should promptly be repudiated
by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.[56]
To conclude, the Malaysian claim to
Sabah, based on the British claim, is not sustainable. The territory was only leased as the British
North Borneo Company and not ceded as the Great Britain, and later Malaysia,
have claimed.
Bibliography
Books
Bassett, D.K. Sulu and Sabah: A study of Brithish Policy Towards the Philippines
and North Borneo from the Late
Eitheenth Century. Book Review, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1978.
Gowing, Peter Gordon.Mandate in Moro Land: The American
Government
of Muslim
Filipinos 1899-1920. Quezon City: New Day Publishers,
1983.
__________________. Muslim Filipinos: Heritage and Horizon. Quezon City [Philippines]:
New Day Publishers, 1979.
Hurley,
Vic. Swish of the Kris; The Story of
the Moros. New York: E.P.Dutton & Co., Inc, 1936.
Ito, Kiyohiko. An Emerging Regime: ASEAN as the Mini-Max Regime.
Columbia, South Carolina: University
of South Carolina, 1988.
Lacson, Arsenio H. "Our
so-called Foreign Policy." Republic
of the
Philippines,Congressional Record,
House of Represntatives. Manila:
Manila Bureau of Printing, 1950. Second Congress of the Philippine Republic,
First Session, Vol. I, 1-42.
Magallona, Merlin M., Editorial
Consultant, A. Suzette V., Editor Suarez, and
Celeste Ruth L., Assistant Editor Cembrano, . The Philippine Claim to a Portion of North
Borneo: Materials and Documents . Quezon City, Metro Manila: Institute of
International Legal Studies, 2003.
Majul, Cesar Adib. Muslin in the Philippines. Quezon City:
University of the
Philippines Press, 1999 Edition.
Mohamad, Abdul Kadir. International Court of Justice Case Between Malaysia and Indonesia
Concerning Sovereignity Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan; Application for
Permission to Intervine by the Philippines; Opening Statement by the Agent for
Malaysia Tan Sri Abdul Mohamad . Hague: International Court of Justice,
2001.
Murphy, Ann Marie. From Conflict to Cooperation in Southeast
Asia, 1961-1967:
The
Disputes Arising Out of the Creation of Malasia and the Establishment of the
Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN). New
York, N.Y.: Columbia University, 2002.
Nisperos, Nestor Martinez. Philippine Foreign Policy On The North
Borneo
Question.
Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg, 1969.
Noble, Lela Garner. Philippine Policy Toward Sabah: A Claim to
Independence. Tucson, Ariz: Published for the Association for Asian Studies
by the University of Arizona Press, 1977.
Oliveros, Renato T. Islam in the Moro-American War (1899-1913):
Implications on Mindanao, the Philippines. Thesis (Ph.D.)--Temple
University, 2005, 2005.
Ortiz, Alan T. Towards a Theory of Ethnic Separatism: A
Case Study of Muslims in the Philippines. Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of
Pennsylvania, 1986.
Severino, Rodolfo C. Where in the World Is the Philippines?
Debating Its National Territory. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2011.
Tarling, Nicholas. Sulu and Sabah: A Study of British Policy
Towards the Philippines and North Borneo from the Late Eighteenth Century.
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978.
Journal Articles
Abdul Samad, Paridah, and Darusalam
Abu Bakar. "Malaysia-Philippine
Relations: The Issue of Sabah." Asian Survey 32 (June 1992): 554-567.
"President Gloria Macapagal’s/Radio
Message calling for Prudence,
Sobriety and Reason over the Sabah
Repatriation Issue." Department
of Foreign Affairs. Malacanang, August 31, 2002.
Ramos, Godofredo P. "Speech Delivered on the
Floor of the House of Representatives on March 29, 1963 by Comgressman
Godofredo P. Ramos, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, In Reply to
the Speech of Senator Lorenzo Sumolong, On the Philippine Claim to North
Borneo." Republic of the
Philippines, House of the Representatives. Manila City: Manila Bureau of
Printing, March 25, 1963. 1-11.
Salonga, Jovito R. "A Point-by-Point Reply
to the Sumolong Report on the Philippine Claim to North Borneo." Republic of the Philippines, House of
Representatives. Manila: Manila Bureau of Printing, 1963. 1-16.
Newspaper Articles
Abdul Aziz, Fauwaz. "Philippine
Consulate needed in Sabah to Protect
Detainees'." Malaysiakini, November 15, 2006.
Aning, Jerome. "Come Clean on
Sabah, Sulu Sultan Urge Gov't." Philippine
Daily
Inquirer, July 16, 2004.
Baginda, Abdul Razak. "Security
and Military Profile." Malaysia.
BERNAMA. “Lahad Datu: Historians
Agree Sabah Rightfully Belongs to Malaysia.” News, March 6, 2013.
http://www.nst.com.my/latest/font-color-red-lahad-datu-font-historians-agree-sabah-rightfully-belongs-to-malaysia-1.229872.
"Deportation of Filipino from
Malaysia." September 2002.
Defensor-Santiago, Miriam. “Sabah
Issue In International Law.” News. Philippine
Daily Inquirer, March 23, 2013. http://opinion.inquirer.net/49361/sabah-issue-in-international-law.
FreeMalaysiaToday.com. “There Was
No Sabah Referendum,” March 8, 2013. https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2013/03/08/there-was-no-sabah-referendum/.
“PROTOCOL OF 1885,” 1885.
http://www.lawnet.sabah.gov.my/Lawnet/SabahLaws/Treaties/Protocol(Madrid).pdf.
Ranawana, Arjuna. "The Malaysian
View: K.L. wants more say over the crisis."
Asian
Week, May 19, 2000.
Rasul, Amina. "Basis of the
Sabah Claim." The Manila Times,
May 14, 2006.
Reuters. "Philippine Sultan Vows to Get Back
Malaysian Sabah." October 4,
2004.
Reuters. "Another Royal Group
lays claim to Sabah." The Straits
Times
Interractive, October 7, 2004.
Uckung, Peter Jaynul V.
"Salvaging Sabah over Territorial Ownership." Manila
Times, September 20, 2006.
Whitman, Paul F. "The Corregidor Massacre-1968.” The 503d P.R.C.T. Heritage Battalion Online.
World;
Asia-Pacific. "Malaysia Probes Migrant Rape
Claim." September 5, 2002.
Zamboanga.com Editorial. "What
Does Sabah Mean in Malaysia?"
Zamboanga.com
News & Editorial. September 12, 2002.
Electronic Media (E-journals and E-news papers)
Burma
Library. October 23, 1998.
http://burmalibrary.orgreg.burma/archives/199810/msg00437.html (accessed 21 12, 2006).
Amin, Raouf. "The Sabah
Ownwership Question." www.bangsamoro.com.
June 11, 2003. http://www.bangsamoro.com
(accessed December 20, 2006).
Cinco, Elinando B. ADJANG Malaysia! March 7, 2005.
http://www.malaysia-today.net (accessed 12 21, 2006).
"External Defence." Geocities. http://forum.cari.com
(accessed December
20, 2006).
Family
Quarrels. November 15, 1968.
http://www.time.com (accessed
December 21, 2006).
GO
FIGURE: Thoughts and Commentary on Economic Issues from a Filipino
Economist. January 23, 2006. http://www.e-bogger.com.
Mahmood, Kazi. "Philippine LAw
Maker Challenge Malaysia's Territorial Interity."
IslamOnline.net. September 3, 2002. http://www.islamonline.net
(accessed December 20, 2006).
"Maysia protest RP's claim on
Sabah." Balitang Marino.
http://www.balitangmarino.com (accessed December 20, 2006).
"Palace backs Sulu heirs in
claim over Sabah." Sun Star Manila.
September
19, 2002. http://www.sunstar.com.ph
(accessed December 20, 2006).
Pascual, Federico D. "Will the
genuen Sulu sultan please stand up?" Manila
mail.com. March 17, 2005. http://www.manilamail.com
(accessed December 20, 2006).
Philippine
Claim to North Borneo. 2 vols.
Manila City: Manila Bureau of
Printing, 1964.
"Philippine Claim To Sabah,
North Borneo, Sultanate of Sulu is Rightful
Owner." Asian Finest Discussion Forum. May 6, 2004.
http://www.asiafinest.com (accessed December 20, 2006).
"PHILIPPINES' CLAIM TO
SABAH." Epilipinas: The Right
Connection.
http://www.epilipinas.com (accessed December 20, 2006).
"Poor Handling of Pinoy revives
claim over Sabah." Sun Star Manila.
August
28, 2002. http://www.sunstar.com.ph
(accessed December 20, 2006).
Puyok, Arnold. "Sulu Sultan Must
give up Sabah." Malysiakini.
October 13, 2004.
http://www.malaysiakini.com (accessed
December 20, 2006).
"Sabah CM brushes off Sulu
Sultan's claim." Utusan Malaysian
Online. October
13, 2004. http://www.utusan.com
(accessed December 20, 2006).
"Sabah- Sulu- Sulu Sultanate or
Malaysia." Cari Forum-Regional
Member
& Gathering. Octorber 14, 2004. http://www.cari.com (accessed
December 20, 2006).
"Sultan of Sulu." Science Fair Project Encyclopedia.
http://www.all-science-fairprojects.com (accessed December 20, 2006).
The
Bangsamoro Online-The Sultan of Sulu's Lost Land. September 20, 2004.
http://www.bangsamoro.info/modules
(accessed December 21, 2006).
Vigilar, Rufi. "Philippines
Sidelines in the Island Dispute." CNN.com.
October
24, 2001.
http://www.cnn.worldnews.printthis.clickability.com (accessed December 20,
2006).
Villanueva, Victor. bikoy.net. August 29, 2002.
http://bikoy.net/archives/2002/08/
(accessed December 21, 2006).
Appendix
[1] Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, “Sabah Issue In International Law,” News, Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 23,
2013, http://opinion.inquirer.net/49361/sabah-issue-in-international-law.
[2] Erwin S. Fernandez,
“Philippine-Malaysia Dispute Over Sabah.” Asia-Pacific
Social Science Review, vol. 7, no. 1 (2007) : 53.
[3] Michael Leifer, The Philippine Claim to Sabah (Ag
Zug: Inter Documentation Co., 1968), 48.
[4] Ibid., 73.
[5] Ibid., 73, 74.
[6] Fernandez,
“Philippine-Malaysia Dispute Over Sabah,” 683-84.
[7] M. O. Ariff, The Philippines Claim to Sabah: Its
Historical, Legal and Political Implications (Singapore: Oxford Univ.
Press., 1970), 64.
[8] BERNAMA, “LAHAD DATU:
Historians Agree Sabah Rightfully Belongs to Malaysia,” March 6, 2013, News,
http://www.nst.com.my/latest/font-color-red-lahad-datu-font-historians-agree-sabah-rightfully-belongs-to-malaysia-1.229872.
[9] FreeMalaysiaToday.com,
“There Was No Sabah Referendum,” March 8, 2013,
https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2013/03/08/there-was-no-sabah-referendum/.
[10] Ariff, The Philippine Claim to Sabah, 64.
[11] Nicholas Tarling, Sulu and Sabah: A study of British policy toward
the Philippines and North Borneo (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press,
1978), 127.
[12] “PROTOCOL OF 1885,”
http://www.lawnet.sabah.gov.my/Lawnet/SabahLaws/Treaties/Protocol(Madrid).pdf.
[13] Lela Gamer Noble, Philippine Policy Toward Sabah: a Claim to Independence
(monograph No 33) (Tucson, Ariz: Assn for Asian Studies Inc, 1977), 8.
[14] Paridah Abd. Samad and
Darussalam Abu Bakar in "Malaysia-Philippine Relations: The Issue of
Sabah,” Asian Survey 32 (June 1992):
554.
[15] Ibid., 566.
[16] Ibid., 554-67.
[17] Arnold Molina Azurin, Beyond the Cult of Dissidence in Southern
Philippines and Wartorn Zones in the Global Village (Quezon City: UP
Center for Integrative and Development Studies and University of the
Philippines Press, 1996), 107.
[18] Ibid., 113.
[19] Asiri Abubakar, Bangsa Sug, Sabah and Sulus’ Quest for Peace
and Autonomy in Southern Philippines (Quezon City: University of the
Philippines, 2000), 248.
[20] Ibid., 265.
[21] Tarling, Sulu and Sabah, 349.
[22] Ibid., 349.
[23] K.G. Tregonning, A History of Modern Sabah: 1881-1963 (London:
Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1960), 68.
[24] Ariff, The Philippine Claim to Sabah, 34, 37.
[25] Ibid., 64.
[26] Leifer, The Philippine Claim to Sabah, 1.
[27] Miriam Defensor-Santiago,
“Sabah Issue In International Law,” News, Philippine
Daily Inquirer, March 23, 2013,
http://opinion.inquirer.net/49361/sabah-issue-in-international-law.
[28] Najeeb M. Saleeby, The History of Sulu (Manila: Filipiniana
Book Guild, 1963), 125.
[29] Peter Gowing, Mosque and Moros: A Study of Muslim in the
Philippines (Manila: Philippine Federation of Christian Churches, 1964),
122-23.
[30] Elizabeth C. Hassell, “The
Shri-Vijayan and Madjapahit Empire,” Philippine
Social Science and Humanities Review, Vol, 16, Iss. 1, March 1953, 3-86.
[31]
W. H. Treacher, British Borneo: Sketches of Brunai, Sarawak,
Labuan, and North Borneo (Singapore: Govt. print. dept, 1891), 5. Stable
Url http://archive.org/stream/yonderyo00gavarich/yonderyo00gavarich_djvu.txt.
[31]
[32] Official Gazette of the
Republic of the Philippines, “The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell,” January
1876,
http://www.gov.ph/1876/01/17/philippine-claim-to-north-borneo-vol-i-the-earl-of-derby-to-lord-odo-russell/.
[33] The Rajah of
Sarawak, Sir James Brooke, KCB, LL.D (29 April 1803 – 11 June 1868) was a
British statesman. His father Thomas Brooke was English; his mother Anna Maria
was born in Hertfordshire, England, the daughter of Scottish peer Colonel
William Stuart, 9th Lord Blantyre, by his mistress Harriott Teasdale. James
Brooke was born in Secrore, a suburb of
Benares, India.
[34] Steven Runciman, The White Rajahs: a History of Sarawak from
1841 to 1946 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1960), 73, 182.
[35] J. Hunt Esq., “Sketch of
Borneo, or Pulo Kalamantan.” The
Expedition to Borneo of HMS Dido. Vol. II (London: Chappan and Hall, 1846), xxiii.
[36] K.G. Tregonning, A History of Modern Sabah, 1881-1963
(Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965), 13-14.
[37] Official Gazette of the
Republic of the Philippines, “Letter of Francis B. Harrison to Vice President
and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Elpidio Quirino,” February 27, 1947, http://www.gov.ph/1947/02/27/letter-of-francis-b-harrison-to-vice-president-and-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-elpidio-quirino/. Mr. Harrison was a former
United States Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. He served as Special
Adviser on Foreign Affairs to President Manuel A. Roxas.
[38] Ibid., 14.
[39] Tregonning, A History of Modern Sabah, 16.
[40] Mujamad Dehamalul Alam,
“Friendly Letter from Our Brother the Paduca Majarasi Maulana Sultan Mujamad
Dehamalul Alam Addressed to His Brother His Excellency the Governor
Captain-General of the Philippines,” July 4, 1878,
http://www.gov.ph/1878/07/04/philippine-claim-to-north-borneo-vol-i-friendly-letter-from-our-brother-the-paduca-majarasi-maulana-sultan-mujamad-dehamalul-alam-addressed-to-his-brother-his-excellency-the-governor-captain-genera/.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Official Gazette of the
Republic of the Philippines, “II. Statement at the Opening Meeting of the
British-Philippine Talks,” January 28, 1963, http://www.gov.ph/1963/01/28/philippine-claim-to-north-borneo-vol-i-ii-statement-at-the-opening-meeting-of-the-british-philippine-talks/.
[43] Nestor M. Nisperos, Philippine Foreign Policy on the North
Borneo Question (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969), 134.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Official Gazette of the
Republic of the Philippines, “Earl Granville to Mr. Morier,” January 7, 1882,
http://www.gov.ph/1882/01/07/philippine-claim-to-north-borneo-vol-i-earl-granville-to-mr-morier/.
[47] Official Gazette of the
Republic of the Philippines, “Statement and Application Addressed to the
Marquis of Salisbury, K. G., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, &c.,
&c., &c., by the Undersigned, on Behalf of Themselves and Their
Associates,” December 2, 1878, http://www.gov.ph/1878/12/02/philippine-claim-to-north-borneo-vol-i-statement-and-application-addressed-to-the-marquis-of-salisbury-k-g-secretary-of-state-for-foreign-affairs-c-c-c-by-the-undersigned-on-behalf-o/.
[48] Official Gazette of the Republic of the
Philippines, “Letter of Francis B. Harrison to Vice President and Secretary of
Foreign Affairs Elpidio Quirino,” February 27, 1947, http://www.gov.ph/1947/02/27/letter-of-francis-b-harrison-to-vice-president-and-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-elpidio-quirino/.
[49] Tregonning, A History of Modern Sabah: 1881-1963,
22.
[50] University of the
Philippines, The Philippine Claim to a
Portion of North Borneo: Materials and Documents (Diliman, Quezon City,
Philippines: Institute of International Legal Studies, University of the
Philippines Law Center, 2003), 287.
[51] Ibid.
[52] “Charles Frederick
Cunningham Macaskie (1888-1969) was called to the bar through Gray's Inn,
entered North Borneo in 1910 and served in the First World War in the Royal
West Kent Regiment. He was Chief Justice and Deputy Governor, North Borneo,
1934-1945, Brigadier and Chief Civil Affairs Officer, British North Borneo,
1945-1946 and Commissioner for War Damage Claims, Borneo Territories,
1947-1951. He held the position of Acting British Judge, New Hebrides in 1955,
1958 and 1959. 1n 1946 he married D. Cole-Adams, daughter of W.H. Legg.”
Source: Frederick C. Macaskie, “Papers of Charles Frederick C. Macaskie”
(University of Oxford: Bodleian Library of Commonwealth & African Studies
at Rhodes House, February 28, 2012),
http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/wmss/online/blcas/macaskie-cfc.html.
[53] Rodolfo C. Severino, Where in the World Is the Philippines?
Debating Its National Territory (Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 2011), 62.
[54] Official Gazette of the
Republic of the Philippines, “Letter of Francis B. Harrison to Vice President
and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Elpidio Quirino,” February 27, 1947, http://www.gov.ph/1947/02/27/letter-of-francis-b-harrison-to-vice-president-and-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-elpidio-quirino/.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.